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Robust Wireless Transmission of Compressed
Latent Fingerprint Images
Nigel M. Allinson, Member, IEEE, Jeevandra Sivarajah, Ian Gledhill, Michael Carling, and Lesley J. Allinson
Abstract—Maximizing the potential of latent fingerprints from
crime scenes in the identification of suspects requires the rapid
transfer of the latent from the scene to a remote fingerprint bureau.
Transmission over restricted-bandwidth cellular wireless networks
requires the latent images to be compressed but without compro-
mising the likelihood of a match being achieved. We present de-
tails of experiments to establish the optimum form of compression
that provides realistic transmission times and yet does not affect the
utility and integrity of the U.K. Fingerprint Service in searching for
latent identifications and in archiving unidentified latents on the
U.K. national automatic fingerprint identification system (AFIS).
Practical aspects of the implemented system, especially in respect
to communication and security protocols, are outlined. Finally, we
give some details of the operational advantages of this system as it
begins to be employed across U.K. police forces.
Index Terms—Fingerprint identification, forensic techniques,
image coding, wireless networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE use of an individual’s fingerprints as a means of iden-tification was first considered in the mid-19th century by
British administrators working in India. They wished to exploit
a simple procedure to combat, what we would now call “iden-
tity theft,” such concerns as pension entitlement and land own-
ership. Recovering the residual traces of fingerprints from crime
scenes was first applied toward the end of that century by John
Faulds [1]. The U.K. Metropolitan Police set up the first fin-
gerprint bureau in 1901 and the first conviction, for burglary,
on fingerprint evidence was obtained the following year. The
steady growth of fingerprint records made manual searching un-
tenable and there were several early attempts during the 1960s
and 1970s to exploit mainframe computer systems. The Royal
Canadian Mounted Police commenced operation of the first au-
tomatic fingerprint-identification system (AFIS) in 1977, with
the U.K. Metropolitan Police following soon afterwards. A short
history of the development of AFISs is given in [2]. The vast
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TABLE I
TYPICAL REQUIRED RESPONSE SCENARIO
majority of police authorities across the world use AFIS tech-
nology to assist in identifying fingerprint latents.1 The U.S. Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation (FBI) AFIS holds fingerprint and
other records for more than 47 million subjects. The smaller
U.K. national AFIS2 contains details of more than seven mil-
lion individuals in the form of ten print (TP) records (TPs are
the reference set of all digits recorded as slaps and rolls and re-
tained as images and minutiae vectors) and, at any one time,
approximately one million unidentified marks (MK) or latents.
Normal practice would be for a crime to be reported and, if
appropriate, a crime scene examiner (CSE) would visit the scene
to collect any forensic evidence. Though a range of fingerprint
recovery techniques exist, most are recovered through dusting
with fine aluminum powder and the print lifted onto clear ad-
hesive tape. This tape is then secured to a thin acetate sheet to
protect the impression—called a lift. Extensive details on the
wealth of fingerprint recovery techniques are provided in [3].
For nonserious and volume crimes, for example, thefts from ve-
hicles and properties, CSEs would normally visit several scenes
during their working day and the lifts would not be returned to
the fingerprint bureau until the end of the day or even later.
It is well recognized that an excessive delay in transporting
lifts back to a bureau would adversely affect the likelihood of
apprehending a suspect. For one U.K. Police Force surveyed,
the average time to transport a lift to its bureau was three days
even though the average response time for a CSE to attend a
crime scene was only 3 h. What was required was a same-day
response, along the lines of the scenario outlined in Table I.
To meet these time restraints, it is necessary, certainly for a
force with jurisdiction over large rural areas, to transmit lift im-
ages directly from the crime scene using commercial cellular
wireless networks. These networks provide in the U.K. more
than 86% and 99% coverage of the U.K. land mass and its popu-
lation, respectively. The population coverage figure is probably
1
“Latent” is the term used in the U.S. and other countries to denote fingerprint
impressions lifted from crime scenes as opposed to inked prints obtained directly
from a subject. In the U.K., the term “mark” is employed.
2The UK national system was called “NAFIS” but following a major refur-
bishment in 2005, it was renamed “Ident 1.” Though this occurred during the
period of the work described here, the operating procedures and, more impor-
tant, the search algorithms used were unaltered. We will use the name NAFIS
throughout to avoid confusion.
1556-6013/$25.00 © 2007 IEEE
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more relevant to the crime scene location than land mass. The
current U.K. Emergency Services cellular network Airwaves
was designed for secure voice communication and possesses
very limited bandwidth for data transmission (typically 3 kb/s).
Lifts are scanned at a standard 500 dpi with 8-b grayscale. A
typical latent image would yield a 1.5–3.0-MB file on average
more than when a single digit is recorded. Practical data rates
using second-generation general-packet radio service (GPRS)
networks are in the range of 20–45 kb/s. This equates to transmit
times of 4–20 min, which is obviously not practical especially
as a single crime scene may yield multiple latents. In order to
achieve realistic transmission times, lossy image compression is
required with the essential proviso that such compression must
not reduce the possibility of obtaining a positive identification
by a bureau-based latent fingerprint examiner (LFE).
This paper describes experiments undertaken to determine
the optimum image compression technique as well as the re-
alization of a secure and robust system for transferring latent
images using commercial networks. Our approach is unusual
in that, unlike other studies on fingerprint compression, we had
the opportunity to conduct our tests using latents recovered from
crime scenes with the corresponding TPs present on NAFIS and
for which a match had been obtained previously. This provides
ground truth verification. Section II provides a brief introduc-
tion to the latent fingerprint identification procedures that are
relevant to this work. Section III outlines image compression op-
tions, previous work on fingerprint image compression, and our
initial studies in selecting appropriate compression standards.
Section IV describes the remote transfer system with special ref-
erence to security issues. Section V describes experiments 1) to
determine the effectiveness of the system over an extended trial
covering a single police force and 2) to determine the validity
in retaining unidentified latents on NAFIS in only compressed
form. Section VI illustrates the value of the system through both
summaries of overall effectiveness and a specific case history
and, finally, Section VII offers a brief conclusion.
II. LATENT FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION
A. Fingerprint Classification
Fingerprints are classified first in terms of the general form
of the ridge and valley appearance (Level 1 detail) and second,
in terms of the occurrence, location, and direction of various
minutiae (Level 2 detail). At Level 1, the fingerprint pattern
reveals regions where the ridge lines assume distinctive shapes
of which four named examples are shown in Fig. 1 and most
current classifications are still based on Henry’s original
scheme [4]. The identification based solely on a limited number
of Level 1 classes is clearly not feasible, so the examination
of Level 2 detail is necessary. At Level 2, the distinguishing
features are the various ways the individual ridges are discon-
tinuous. These minutiae, of which a few common forms are
represented diagrammatically in Fig. 2, have been classified
in several ways. The ANSI standard [5] proposes a taxonomy
based on four classes—terminations, bifurcations, compound
(crossovers), and undetermined. Some experts have suggested
up to 150 different minutiae variations [6], though most LFEs
can probably identify, at most, about 20 types. Most current
Fig. 1. Examples of Level 1 fingerprint descriptors. Adapted from [5].
Fig. 2. Examples of Level 2 fingerprint descriptors (minutiae).
AFIS algorithms only identify and exploit terminations and
bifurcations. Details of NAFIS or, indeed, AFIS systems, in
general, are not of concern to this study. What is important is
that any developed scheme has to be compatible with existing
identification processes, including NAFIS and, above all, not
compromise the ability to make identifications. Some aspects
of current AFIS systems are provided in [7] and [8]; however,
it should be noted that details of image data enhancement and
filtering, feature detection, and search algorithms employed in
AFIS systems are generally commercially confidential.
B. Outline of Identification Process
The LFE will first make a judgment on the overall quality of
the latent as to whether it is worth proceeding with a search. The
latent lift is scanned and the resulting image entered into NAFIS
as an unidentified MK. The image is rotated and cropped by the
LFE, to ensure that the fingerprint region is only retained and is
at approximately the correct orientation. NAFIS then processes
the image and labels the various minutiae. The LFE inspects
the results and will delete marked minutiae they are not sat-
isfied are correct, and may add additional ones of their own.
They will also indicate, if possible, the specific finger corre-
sponding to the MK. A search is then launched at the local,
regional, or national level. The system returns an ordered list
(typically 15 items) of TPs ranked in terms of their auto-en-
code score. This score is a measure of the similarity between
the MK and each recovered TP, and is a function of the number,
distribution, type, and strength of the corresponding minutiae.
Its detailed formulation is commercially confidential. The LFE
inspects, pairwise, the submitted MK image and each returned
TP image in turn; and it is they who make the decision on a
match and not NAFIS. If no match is located in the first list,
then the next set of ordered matches can be inspected. A pos-
itive identification is based on the proficiency and skill of the
individual examiner. An earlier legal standard of proof based
on a threshold number of corresponding points (e.g., minutiae)
has been abandoned in many countries. The U.S. discarded this
approach in 1973 and the U.K. in 2001 (though Scotland re-
tained a 16-point comparison standard until 2006). This outlines
the normal process of identifying a latent and is referred to as
a mark/ten-print (MK/TP) search. Other search types are regu-
larly undertaken, for example, from a known individual’s TP on
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NAFIS to the database of unidentified latents—a TP/MK search.
What is important is that ground truth as to whether identifica-
tion is made rests with the human expert and is not determined
by the AFIS system whose primary function is to act as a search
engine. The suitability of any image compression scheme needs
to be considered in its effect on potential identifications by an
expert LFE and its effect on searching by an AFIS.
As the criminal justice system differs from country to country,
a short note of U.K. practice in relation to how fingerprint ev-
idence is employed in criminal prosecutions and in the courts
is appropriate. The identification of a suspect can be made on
the basis of a fingerprint match, and this suspect’s details would
then be released to the relevant police operational division and
the suspect could be subsequently arrested on this identifica-
tion. The justification for arrest is that reasonable grounds exist
that a suspect has committed an offense. The arrestee may later
be charged when there are reasonable grounds that a successful
prosecution can be obtained. Individuals may be arrested but
no charge may be subsequently brought. All of these proce-
dures are described in the codes of practice that form part of
the U.K. Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE): 1984 [9].
Prior to charging, all evidence would be reassessed, including
fingerprints, and reference would be made to the physical lifts.
If the case progresses to court, the appropriate fingerprint officer
would present his or her reasons for positive identification and
the physical lifts would be entered as evidence.
III. LATENT IMAGE COMPRESSION
A. Previous Image Compression Studies
To achieve the necessary reduction in transmission time, the
image coding will have to be lossy. Most studies on the com-
pression of fingerprint images have been concerned with the re-
quirement to reduce the overall memory requirements of very
large databases of TPs rather than much poorer and variable
quality latents. In our case, we are constrained by the overriding
need to be congruent with existing systems. Compression stan-
dards for which software-based codecs exist within NAFIS are
JPEG, JPEG2000 and WSQ. JPEG [10], being a block-based
DCT approach, suffers from visible blocking artifacts and loss
of fine details (e.g., ridge pores) even at relatively low com-
pression rates for fingerprint images. Though the unsuitability
of JPEG compression has been known for some time [11], it is
still employed in some systems. Wide-area AFIS systems with
fixed connections to remote terminals often employ such com-
pression to return TP images of potential matches to bueaux.
For example, NAFIS displays images of returned TPs as 12:1
JPEGs (reference images are archived in lossless JPEG format).
Wavelet scalar quantization (WSQ) was developed by the FBI,
Los Alamos National Laboratory, and the National Institute of
Standards Technology (NIST) specifically to reduce the media
storage requirements of the FBI’s expanding AFIS facility by
providing lossy compression over the range 10:1 to 20:1 [12].
Documentation of the WSQ standard is available at [13].
Both WSQ and JPEG2000 schemes are based around wavelet
transforms, but with major differences in the form of the de-
composition tree, quantization, and entropy coding employed.
The WSQ uses the Daubechies (9,7) filter [14] and the same
Fig. 3. Schematics of decomposition trees. (a) WSQ. (b) Mallat.
filter is the default in the irreversible JPEG2000 transform.
The JPEG2000 employs a dyadic decomposition tree based
on Mallat’s original scheme [15], while WSQ employs a fixed
structure with a larger number of sub-bands (Fig. 3). The greater
decomposition structure of WSQ may enhance compression
as it approximates orthnormalization [16]. The decomposition
structure will influence the number of length of the zero coding
runs, while the bit-plane scanning order of JPEG2000 permits
finer control to achieve an arbitrarily specified compression
rate. Both schemes use scalar quantization with JPEG2000
having the quantization step varying in response to the dynamic
range of the respective sub-band. While for WSQ, all quantizer
steps are uniform except for a lengthened middle interval. For
the last coding step, WSQ employs Huffman entropy coding
while JPEG2000 uses arithmetic coding. The WSQ coding
table is calculated for each image and the coefficients are
included in the file header.
There have been a limited number of studies comparing
the relative merits of WSQ and JPEG2000 for compressing
fingerprint images. Most of this work has focused on coding
high-quality inked prints or live print capture, and not poorer
quality latents. Reference [17] showed a significant improve-
ment for JPEG2000 over WSQ (at 0.75 bpp or 10.7:1 compres-
sion) in terms of peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) and receiver
operating curves (ROCs) for different sources—namely, ca-
pacitive sensor, optical sensor, and scanned inked prints. A
study of JPEG2000 and WSQ interoperability [18] concluded
that JPEG2000 produced a slightly lower quality reconstructed
image compared to WSQ for the same file size. Compression
ratios were in the range of 11.0:1 to 17.2:1, and the metrics
employed were PSNR and image-quality metric (IQM) [19].
Current ISO/IEC standards on information technology—bio-
metric data interchange formats [20] recommend WSQ for
500-dpi fingerprint images with compression limited to 15:1,
but for images with greater than 500 dpi, it recommends JPEG
2000 at 15:1. As far as the authors are aware, no study had been
undertaken on the effects of image compression on identifica-
tion rates using an operational AFIS system.
B. Evaluation of Optimum Image Compression
Experiments using representative latent test sets, in terms of
subjective image quality (judged by experienced LFEs), were
conducted to determine a preferred compression technique
and corresponding compression ratio. The test sets were: 1)
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Fig. 4. Example uncropped latents from test sets.
a 19-image set created by FBI/NIST and 2) a 12–image set
created by the U.K. Home Office Scientific Development
Branch (HOSDB). The HOSDB set was of generally poorer
image quality and more representative of latents recovered from
crime scenes. This set had the additional advantage that the
corresponding TP records existed on NAFIS so a ground truth
search was possible. Typical examples from each set are shown
in Fig. 4. All original images were uncompressed RAW/TIFF
formats at 500 dpi and 8-b gray scale. The JPEG2000 codec
employed was an integration of the JJ2000 Java reference
implementation [21] with the core coding system conforming
to the ISO/IEC 15444– 1 specification [22]. The WSQ codec
was an integration of the NIST release [23] of the FBI’s WSQ
encoder and decoder.
A summary of the PSNR of the compressed images is given
in Table II. The PSNR for an 8-b image is defined as
where the mean square error ( ) is given
by
where and are the original and compressed images,
respectively, each of size pixels.
Higher PSNR means less distortion with no distortion
equating to a dB.
JPEG2000 performs consistently better than WSQ, which, in
turn, performs better than JPEG. It is not always possible to
produce highly compressed JPEGs due to the relatively large
magnitude of its base image representation. The FBI/NIST im-
ages are of higher quality so their PSNR falls faster as compres-
sion is increased than for the poorer quality PSDB set. This is
to be expected as the HOSDB images contain a smaller con-
TABLE II
TEST SET PEAK SIGNAL-TO-NOISE RATIO (PSNR)
FOR DIFFERENT COMPRESSION TYPES
Fig. 5. Comparative compressed images of 64 64 pixel region from HOSDB
Image 41. Contrast has been stretched to increase visibility.
tribution of high spatial frequency components. Compressing a
poor quality lift does not make it relatively more distorted than a
higher quality lift. The PSNR does provide a reliable and simple
method for comparing images but only if they possess similar
content. The limitations of JPEG for fingerprint compression
have been mentioned previously, and the comparative images
of the same 64 64 pixel region in Fig. 5 indicate that JPEG
blocking artifacts are clearly visible at 32:1 compression. The
JPEG compression option is not considered further.
Discussions with LFEs suggested that they could operate nor-
mally to mark-up and manually compare latent images that had
been subject to heavy compression—up to about 64:1 WSQ and
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TABLE III
SUMMARY OF NAFIS SEARCH RESULTS FOR COMPARATIVE
JPEG2000/WSQ COMPRESSION
Fig. 6. Autoencode scores for typical poor- and good-quality latents as a func-
tion of JPEG2000 and WSQ compression ratios.
JPEG2000. Blind testing confirmed that they were unaware of
any visual difference of compressed images to uncompressed
ones up to about a 24:1 ratio. What was more important was
the ability of NAFIS to perform satisfactorily, primarily in its
search function, with compressed images. A series of trials was
conducted with experienced LFEs with the HOSDB test set and
other latent images. An LFE would align and crop the selected
image in the normal manner and then submit to NAFIS for a full
national search. There was no attempt by the examiner to modify
the automatically generated minutiae marks. The returned au-
toencode score and rank position (if available) were recorded
TABLE IV
PAIRED t-TEST SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR
COMPARATIVE MK/TP NAFIS SEARCHES.
for a range of WSQ and JPEG2000 compression ratios. A sum-
mary of results is given in Table III. For compression ratios less
than 32:1, JPEG2000 consistently produced higher ident rates
than WSQ.
Additional findings from these studies were as follows.
• For about 60% of latents, moderately compressed images
provided higher autoencode scores then their corre-
sponding uncompressed image. Fig. 6 shows typical plots
for a poor and a good quality latent image. Increased AFIS
coding scores had been observed previously for WSQ
compression in a study of one-to-one fingerprint matching
[24].
• If an uncompressed latent was identified (i.e., ranked), it
remained ranked to at least 64:1 compression though the
rank number may increase rapidly at higher compression
ratios (i.e., beyond the ranking range that would normally
be considered during routine searches).
• A few latents, about 16%, that were not identified from
their uncompressed image were ranked (sometimes in first
position) for moderate levels of compression.
These investigations confirm that JPEG2000 coding is supe-
rior to WSQ primarily in terms of ident rate for moderate levels
of compression. For the ensuring system development and ap-
plication, a compression ratio of 16:1 was employed as meeting
the requirements of reducing transmission time per latent to a
realistic 20–80 s, providing the highest ident rate if the ranking
range was truncated at the normal limit of searching and pro-
viding no visual clues to the LFE as to the nature of the image
format.
The ground truth for the acceptability of any compression
scheme is that it does not affect the likelihood of a positive
ident being obtained following standard operating procedures.
Several studies, with different LFEs and test sets, were under-
taken to confirm the suitability of 16:1 JPEG2000 compres-
sion in the normal operating environment. Individual LFEs, fol-
lowing standard working procedures, marked up latents in both
uncompressed TIFF and 16:1 JPEG2000 formats and launched
national searches on NAFIS. The results of a typical study are
summarized in Table IV, where ten cases produced positive
idents. A paired test applied to those lifts where there was an
autoencoding score for image format pairs, indicating that the
JPEG2000 format yields a higher score than the WSQ format
, .
IV. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The system is essentially an interlink that brings together the
postmanual acquisition of lifts at a crime scene with their pre-
submission of their electronic representation for the use on the
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bureau-based AFIS. In general, it incorporates the common ac-
tivities users would be familiar with in acquiring and transfer-
ring electronic images via e-mails. However, it is underlined
by solutions designed to address the demands and constraints
attributed with this process, including the efficient use of low
bandwidth, maintaining image quality, and providing secure and
reliable transfer across the public networks.
The software is comprised of five main parts; namely: 1) the
graphical user interface (GUI); 2) image capturing; 3) image
compression; 4) file security; and 5) e-mail transfer.
The user interface is kept simple to take ergonomic factors
into account as often the CSE will need to operate in a con-
strained environment (e.g., inside vehicles). Software function-
ality follows an identified path flow where, from the click of a
button, the user is taken through successive processes of scan-
ning lifts, completing an incident form that includes the spe-
cific exhibit and crime scene details (forms are customizable to
suit different force requirements), compressing the image, com-
posing an e-mail, securing the e–mail attachments with crypto-
graphic protection, and, finally, launching the e-mail.
Image capture employs a generic device driver that interfaces
with any device, typically a flatbed scanner, which supports the
TWAIN interface standard [25]. The software supports the en-
coding and decoding of images in various formats, including
JPEG, TIFF, JPEG2000, and WSQ; all with codecs meeting
their relevant reference standards. Options as to which codec
is available and at what compression ratio can only be changed
by an administrator. Under normal use, the CSE is restricted to
16:1 JEP2000 compression.
The system’s security module is based on the well-known
public-key infrastructure (PKI) scheme [26]. This system is es-
sentially for the management of public-key cryptography which
allows users to be authenticated to each other and to use the in-
formation in identity certificates (i.e., each other’s public and
private keys) to encrypt and decrypt transmitted information.
Each user is associated with a keystore based on the personal
information exchange syntax standard (PKCS#12) [27] which
defines the file format of the infrastructure used to store private
keys with their accompanying public-key certificates. Each user
is bound to a private key and its corresponding public certificate
in his or her own keystore and also, in some cases, to a shared
private key and its corresponding public certificate if the user is
part of a workgroup that is considered as a shared identity by
other users interacting with the workgroup. These keystore en-
tries are password protected; hence, the password also plays a
role in the system’s login access. Unsuccessful attempts during
login to the system also defeats the loading and availability of
all cryptography keys that are essential in identifying the user
and facilitating secure interactions with other users. Apart from
the user-associated keystore, each user possesses his or her own
peer keystore which is the infrastructure to hold all public-key
certificates of other users that the individual user could interact
with through the system.
The implemented PKI does not involve third-party vetting of
and vouching for user identities. The role of this third-party cer-
tificate authority is not seen as essential because the informa-
tion exchanged through the system is not intended for distri-
bution to any party in the public domain and is confined to a
group of identified users. The management of identity certifi-
cates among this circle of users is intended to be carried out
centrally where an administrator is responsible for collecting
and distributing public certificates among the users involved.
However, the software eases the exchange of public certificates
with implemented import and export features using the XML
format. The use of the XML format also provides a means for
future developments where the need for interfacing the system
with external systems, such as database web-based services, is
to facilitate a more efficient way of managing and distributing
public certificates. The exchange of confidential private keys is
secured with password-based encryption.
In the current system, interactions with other users are car-
ried out primarily through the use of e-mail. The e-mail client
is based on Sun’s JavaMail framework and supports SMTP and
POP3 protocols. Attached fingerprint files are either sent as un-
encrypted with an attached signature file or, if necessary, they
can be further secured with encryption. The former involves the
generation of a digital signature using the SHA-1 algorithm [28]
and the digital encryption of this signature using pretty good pri-
vacy (PGP) [29], employing the sender’s private key. This does
not prevent the file from being viewed by a third party, but using
the sender’s public key at the recipient’s host confirms that file
content has not been altered. To prevent third-party viewing of
the file, the sender can further opt to encrypt the image files with
PGP, employing the CAST-5 [30] cipher and this involves the
public key of the recipient. At the recipient’s end, the recipient
will need to employ his or her private key to decrypt the file.
V. IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIMENTS
A. Force-Wide Trials
Radically changing a critical aspect of the way forensic fin-
gerprint evidence is processed necessitates extreme caution be-
fore adoption on a countrywide basis. As there was no reduc-
tion in the ident rates achieved using compressed images from
a series of small-scale experiments, it was agreed to conduct an
extended large-scale live trial that followed normal operating
practice. This was executed over a nine-month period within
the Lincolnshire Police. This force is one of the smaller Eng-
lish forces with 26 CSEs who cover the second largest Eng-
lish county (approximately 7000 ). It also has its own fin-
gerprint bureau with 10 LFEs who provide 16 h cover per day
and is situated at the Force’s headquarters. CSEs were supplied
with a laptop with the capture/transmission software installed,
an integral GPRS wireless card, and a flatbed scanner (Fig. 7);
they were also given initial training in the use of the system and
provided with ongoing technical and other support. The suit-
ability of the scanner, in terms of accuracy in reproducing la-
tent images, was confirmed through a series of investigations by
HOSDB. The lifts were taken in the normal manner. The period
of study occurred when the system for electronic transfer was
being gradually rolled out across the force, so individual CSEs
had to transport the lifts to the bureau by road where they would
be scanned by bureau staff, or to scan lifts at the crime scene
and transmit them directly to the bureau as 16:1 JPEG2000 files.
The collated results at the end of this trial period are given in
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Fig. 7. Prototype latent scanning/wireless transmission system in use by a CSE.
TABLE V
COLLATED RESULTS FOR NINE-MONTH FORCE-LEVEL TRIAL
Table V, where “traditional” refers to road transport to the bu-
reau and “remote” to crime scene scanning and compression.
The ratio of traditional to remote is approximately 3.3:1 and the
average number of lifts per crime scene examined is the same
for both transfer methods. Though there is a higher percentage
of idents obtained using wireless transmission (17.9% versus
14.8%), a chi-square test of independence indicates that this dif-
ference is not significant , .
The difference in no-value lifts for the two conditions is signif-
icant , .
The question that naturally arises is “Did this gradual change
in transport mode create an inadvertent bias in the above re-
sults?” It is therefore necessary to confirm that the lifts sent
by the two methods were from the same population (i.e., there
is no difference in the average quality of lifts sent by the two
routes). A randomized selection of 90 original lifts (60 tradi-
tionally transported and 30 wireless transmitted) was presented
to six LFEs from the London Metropolitan Police fingerprint
bureau, who were unaware of the transport mode. They were
asked to judge the quality of the lifts on a 5-point Likert Scale.
The descriptive statistics are provided in Table VI. A two-way
factorial ANOVA yielded no main effect for the transport mode
, . There was a main effect for the ex-
pert quality ratings , . A Tukey HSD
post-hoc test revealed a significant pairwise variation between
the quality ratings used by the experts. This means that the dif-
ferent experts used the rating scale differently. More important
though, there was no interaction effect
; hence, the individual experts used their own rating scale
consistently.
TABLE VI
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR EXPERT QUALITY
ASSESSMENT OF LIFT SAMPLES
The conclusion drawn from this comprehensive trial is that
there is no reduction in idents through the use of 16:1 JPEG2000
images but that the remote transfer of these images greatly re-
duces the time delay to obtain an ident and so enhancing the
value of the forensic evidence. An interesting side issue, high-
lighted by the significant difference in no-value lifts between
uncompressed and compressed formats, is the possible advan-
tage of wavelet compression of improving poor-quality lifts.
This effect is also apparent in the frequently observed increase
in the NAFIS autoencoding score for low values of compression.
Wavelet decomposition is commonly employed to improve the
quality of a wide range of signal types by reducing noise arte-
facts, and similar effects may occur in this case [31].
B. Compression Image Storage
Having confirmed that effective and uncompromised
searching could be achieved using compressed latent im-
ages, then some of the efficiency gains in productivity would
be forfeited if uncompressed versions of unidentified lifts had
to be subsequently loaded onto NAFIS by bureau staff into the
current archive of unidentified latents. It is necessary, therefore,
to confirm that there was no loss in search capability for TP/MK
searches. This is potentially a different search scenario to the
more usual MK/TP searches. The methodology was to present
11 independent LFEs with a randomized set of representative
latent images (in TIFF and 16:1 JPEG2000 formats) with each
examiner marking up 15 lifts of each format. Though there
were corresponding image format pairs of each latent, no
officer saw more than one example of each latent. Lifts were
all cropped and prealigned before these officers began their
markups. This was carried out by a single experienced LFE to
ensure consistency in the latent presentation to NAFIS, who
took no further part in the experiment. The set of 60 latent
lift images was carefully selected to be fully representative
of the range of expected latent quality found in practice. The
composition of the test set was agreed with the HOSDB and
independent fingerprint experts.
A smaller set (10) of chemical lifts was included as foils
to eliminate any bias due to potentially detected differences in
image appearance. Chemical lifts are photographs (either dig-
ital or 35-mm film) of fingerprint-ridge detail that have been
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TABLE VII
DESCRIPTIVE AND PAIRED t-TEST SUMMARY STATISTICS
FOR JPEG2000 MK/TP AND TP/MK NAFIS SEARCHES
found on items seized at crime scenes and produced by chem-
ically treating them with reagents that react with perspiration
deposits. The chemical laboratory that develops these latents is
normally attached to the fingerprint bureau and they can have a
markedly different visual appearance to powder lifts. All lifts
had previously been identified on NAFIS and related to real
cases (though all legally closed). Full national searches were ini-
tiated and both MK/TP and TP/MK searches were undertaken.
The autoencoding score and rankings were recorded for all suc-
cessful matches. Normal working practices were followed as far
as possible, and the participants were unaware of the precise
purpose of the experiment other than it involved an assessment
of latent image quality. LFEs were asked to search as far down
the ranking list in order to complete visual comparisons of the
returned matches with each presented latent as they would in a
normal operational environment. The key measure is the ident
rate for the various conditions—a change in an autoencoding
score or rank number would not affect an examiner’s decision
on a match.
A paired -test comparing TIFF MK/TP searches
( , ) and JPEG2000 MK/TP searches
( , ) showed no significant difference
, ; and a paired -test comparing
TIFF TP/MK searches ( , ) and
JPEG2000 TP/MK searches ( , )
showed no significant difference , .
Summary statistics are given in Table VII. As there is the
possibility of falsely accepting the null hypothesis (i.e.,
Type II error) a post-hoc statistical power test is performed.
For MK/TP searches, the power and for TP/MK
searches . Powers greater than 0.80 are taken to
indicate a strong statistical test. The conclusion is that there is
no disadvantage in using compressed images in both MK/TP
and TP/MK searches and, hence, unidentified latents need only
be retained in compressed format on NAFIS.
VI. BENEFITS TO POLICE OPERATIONS
A. General Improvements
For the police force where the extended trial was conducted,
prior to the wireless transmission of lifts, the average time to
ident was four days. This delay composed of a delay of three
days for the lift to reach the bureau and a further delay for it be
recorded and scanned before a NAFIS search could be initiated.
Postutilization of the wireless transmission of compressed la-
tent images, the average time to ident is just under 2 h. Though
a lift can be transmitted in less than a minute, there is a series
of in-bureau procedures to complete. The latent image has to
be launched onto NAFIS and a search instigated. The LFE will
then inspect the returned TPs for a match. If a match is found,
then another LFE as well as the Head of Bureau or their desig-
nate must confirm it before a suspect’s identity can be released.
It is more difficult to assess the system’s contribution to crime
rates and arrests, as there is a range of external and other internal
factors that have a bearing on collated crime statistics. For bur-
glaries, there has been a long-term decline in numbers across the
U.K., but for the year that this system was in operation for the
trial force, its burglary rate fell by 8% for 2005–2006 against a
national picture of no annual change [32].
B. Case Example
The developed system has made a significant impact on re-
ducing the average time to obtain ident from crime scene latents
and this has contributed in increased clearup rates for several
categories of offense. However, it is its contribution to specific
cases that really demonstrates the system’s capabilities. Many
cases are still progressing through the U.K.’s legal system and
so cannot be reported; however, the example given below has
completed all such processes.
A 92-year-old woman was attacked and robbed in the street
of the Lincolnshire town of Gainsborough. The incident gener-
ated considerable public concern and the local police were under
heightened pressure to make progress. Acting on local intelli-
gence, they had a suspect but insufficient grounds to make an
arrest. The police raided a flat where the suspect and his partner
were temporarily living but a search failed to find any property
from the robbery. There were well-grounded reasons to believe
that if the suspect was not detained then he would quickly flee
from the area. Near the flat, there was a car that had been re-
ported stolen from a neighboring county. The keys from this car
were found on the suspect’s partner but there was nothing to di-
rectly link the suspect to the vehicle. It became vitally important
to associate the suspect with this vehicle. A CSE was dispatched
to the scene and he searched the vehicle. A fingerprint was found
on the car’s wing mirror; this was lifted and the resulting lift
(Fig. 8) was scanned and transmitted directly from the scene.
The lift was searched at the force bureau and the suspect’s ident
was confirmed. It took only 30 min between the examiner ar-
riving at the scene and a positive ident to be made. The suspect
was arrested and remanded for vehicle theft. This gave the po-
lice sufficient time to collect and analyze CCTV tapes from the
town that showed the suspect following the victim through the
streets prior to the attack. The suspect was charged the following
week with aggravated robbery and sentenced to four year’s im-
prisonment seven months later.
VII. CONCLUSION
This series of experimental studies, together with the anal-
ysis of an extended trial, have confirmed the suitability of 16:1
JPEG2000 compression for the effective and reliable transmis-
sion of fingerprint latents directly from crime scenes. The capa-
bility to establish ground truth on any possible effects image
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Fig. 8. Latent recovered from stolen car (see case example).
compression may have on ident rates made this work highly
principled in its approach. The outcome of this study and its pre-
sentation to the U.K. National Fingerprint Board (The body, in-
corporating a range of stakeholders, that oversees the operation
of all fingerprint activities with the U.K.) was that the system
should be adopted by all U.K. police forces and that unidenti-
fied latents can be archived on NAFIS in compressed JPEG2000
format except for a small number of serious crimes (where the
uncompressed image must be loaded and retained on NAFIS as
well). At the time of writing, ten police forces use the system
with 16 more in the process of adopting it.
General future improvements in network bandwidth (e.g.,
EDGE or G2.75, and UMTS or G3) may alleviate the require-
ment for compression. However, there are no plans within
the U.K. and many other countries that such networks will
provide full countrywide coverage. There are also proposals
that fingerprint image resolution be increased from 500 dpi
to 1000 dpi, which may reinforce the need for compression.
The WSQ compression standard was developed for inked TPs,
and JPEG2000 was developed for the widest range of possible
imagery; so it may be productive to examine the potential for
custom image coding schemes tuned to the specific and unique
nature of latent fingerprint images.
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